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  This paper examines grocery retailers’ ability to influence prices charged to consumers and 
paid to suppliers. We discuss how retailer market power manifests itself in terms of pricing 
and marketing strategies by setting forth and offering evidence in support of eight “stylized 
facts” of retailer pricing and brand decisions. We argue that little, if any, of this behavior can 
be explained by a model of a competitive, price-taking retailer, but that most of the indicated 
behavior was also inconsistent with traditional models of market power. Finally, we discuss 
the impacts of aspects of this retailer behavior on the upstream farm sector.  
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The relationship between commodity prices at the 
farm and the prices consumers pay at retail is a 
topic of obvious importance and longstanding 
interest in agricultural economics. The relation-
ship, known as the farm-retail price spread or the 
marketing margin, has been studied and measured 
extensively through the years.
1 In many cases the 
relationship has been depicted as a simple mark-
up function. For example, George and King (1971) 
suggested that the margin, Mj, for commodity j 
could be expressed as Mj=αj+βj
r
j P , where 
r
j P is 
the price at retail of the finished product. 
  Grocery retailing has changed dramatically in 
the 35 years since the seminal George and King 
study. Traditional corner grocery stores have been 
mostly replaced by large supermarket chains, and 
now the dominance of the chains is being threat-
ened by the remarkable growth of Wal-Mart as a 
grocery retailer (Hausman and Leibtag 2004). 
Further, the way grocery retailers do business has 
changed. Traditional terminal markets for fresh 
produce commodities have declined in impor-
tance and have been replaced by direct procure-
ment from grower-shippers via contracts. Retail-
ers through marketing contracts exercise consid-
erable vertical market control over upstream sup-
pliers and utilize their own store or private label 
brands to compete for sales with the brands they 
procure from independent manufacturers and 
shippers. Retailers also use a variety of strategies 
to differentiate themselves from their competitors. 
  The growth of large grocery retail chains, fu-
eled in large part through a wave of mergers, has 
caused increasing concentration in the retail food 
sector. Rising concentration, in turn, has height-
ened concerns about retailers’ ability to influence 
prices charged to consumers through possible 
exercise of oligopoly power, and prices paid to 
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2 See Kaufman (2000), Kaufman et al. (2000), and Harris et al. (2002) 
for recent summaries of merger and acquisition activities in U.S. 
grocery retailing. See Cooper (2003) and Dobson, Waterson, and 
Davies (2003) for summaries of concentration issues in European food 
retailing. International mergers and acquisitions have also been in-
creasing significantly in the retail sector. For example, EU-based retail-
ers such as Royal Ahold and Sainsbury have expanded into U.S. 
markets, and Wal-Mart has expanded into the European Union. As a  
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  Understanding retailer market power, pricing 
practices, and marketing strategies is critical for 
many reasons. Most obvious is the impacts that 
retailer behavior can have on consumer and pro-
ducer welfare.
3 Assessment of various practices 
in grocery retailing, such as use of slotting fees, 
depends upon whether such fees have a basis in 
efficiency or are a manifestation of retailer market 
power. Further, the impacts of various policies 
and strategies intended to increase farm prices 
and incomes hinge critically upon the competi-
tiveness of the market chain.
4 For example, little 
is known about how the effectiveness of farm-
sector programs, such as mandatory commodity 
promotion, is enhanced or impeded by retailers’ 
market power and the pricing strategies they util-
ize. If retailers respond to a commodity advertis-
ing campaign by raising retail margins to absorb 
any demand increase induced by the promotion, 
the higher sales needed to induce an increase in 
the producer price will not materialize. On the 
other hand, if retailers respond to a positive de-
mand shock by reducing price, and some evi-
dence supports this outcome (Warner and Barsky 
1995, Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi 2003, and 
Li 2006), the effect would be to enhance the im-
pact of the promotion. 
  This paper examines grocery retailers’ ability 
to influence prices charged to consumers and paid 
to suppliers through exercise of oligopoly and 
oligopsony power. We then ask how retailer 
power manifests itself in terms of the pricing and 
marketing strategies that food retailers undertake. 
Specifically, we set forth eight features of retailer 
pricing and brand decisions that we argue are 
documented sufficiently to merit status as “styl-
ized facts.” The stylized facts are illustrated with 
results from our own work, together and with 
various co-authors, but in almost all cases the evi-
 
                                                                                   
result, food retailing is becoming increasingly multinational, with three 
food retailers—Wal-Mart, Carrefour, and Royal Ahold—now appear-
ing in the world’s top 100 multinational corporations. 
3 Estimates of consumer welfare loss due to market power in the food 
system, such as Parker and Connor (1979) and Bhuyan and Lopez 
(1995), emphasized the market power of food manufacturers and 
focused exclusively on oligopoly power. 
4 Alston, Sexton, and Zhang (1997) demonstrated that even modest 
levels of oligopoly or oligopsony power in the downstream processing-
retailing sector could enable it to capture large shares of the market 
surplus that otherwise would go to producers and final consumers. 
Zhang and Sexton (2002) demonstrated that downstream market power 
can both distort producer incentives to undertake investments such as 
R&D and commodity promotion and enable the downstream sector to 
capture a large share of the benefits generated by such investments. 
dence is broader, as citations indicate. We then 
ask to what extent these observed practices are 
consistent with traditional notions of farm-retail 
price spreads, or, for that matter, can be explained 
at all by the existing economic theory. Finally, we 
discuss the impacts of aspects of this retailer be-
havior on the upstream farm sector. 
 
Evidence on Grocery Retailer Market Power 
 
The hypothesis that large grocery retailers pos-
sess some degree of market power in the sense of 
being able to influence the prices they pay to sup-
pliers and charge to consumers rests on solid con-
ceptual foundations. Consumers are distributed 
geographically and incur nontrivial transaction 
costs in traveling to and from stores. This condi-
tion leads to a spatial distribution of grocery 
stores, and gives a typical store market power 
over those consumers located in close proximity 
to the store and, hence, the ability to influence 
prices (Faminow and Benson 1985, Benson and 
Faminow 1985, Walden 1990, and Azzam 1999). 
Other considerations that enhance retailers’ power 
to influence consumer prices include imperfect 
information among consumers (e.g., as to the prices 
that are being offered), and differentiation among 
retailers based upon the services they emphasize, 
advertising they conduct, and marketing strategies 
they pursue.
5
  From the perspective of retailer buying power, 
it seems likely that large food manufacturers with 
prominent brands are able to countervail any re-
tailer buying power, but produce grower-shippers 
and private-label manufacturers lack similar bar-
gaining power. The imbalance of bargaining 
power is exacerbated in industries where the farm 
product is highly perishable. 
 
Evidence on Grocery Retailer Oligopoly Power 
 
Oligopoly power in food retailing is not amenable 
to the application of most methods used by econo-
mists to investigate market power because modern 
 
5 For discussions of imperfect information in retail markets, see Salop 
and Stiglitz (1977, 1982), Varian (1980), Sobel (1984), Lal and Mat-
utes (1994), Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004b), and Pesendorfer (2002); 
for discussions of differentiation of pricing and marketing strategies 
among retailers, see Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Varian (1980), Lal and 
Rao (1997), Pesendorfer (2002), Sexton, Zhang, and Chalfant (2003), 
and Boatwright, Dhar, and Rossi (2004). 
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groceries sell a vast number of different products—
an average of 40,000 or more distinct product codes 
for U.S. supermarkets (Dimitri, Tegene, and Kauf-
man 2003), and issues of oligopoly power must 
address mark-ups over cost for a broad cross section 
of those commodities, not just one or a few. Further, 
retailers’ costs are usually impossible to know or to 
apportion among individual commodities. 
 Structure-conduct-performance studies have 
sought to explain grocery prices as a function of 
demand, cost, and market structure variables and 
can be useful because prices are observed readily 
and can be aggregated into meaningful indices. 
These studies have generally found that concentra-
tion variables were positively associated with price 
and were statistically significant.
6 The positive 
correlation between pricing and concentration found 
in the majority of studies lends credence to the 
aforementioned concerns that rising concentration 
among grocery retailers is likely to cause higher 
prices to consumers, and, due to reduced sales, ad-
verse price effects on producers as well. 
  Some evidence suggests that the astounding 
rise of Wal-Mart in food retailing may represent a 
countervailing force to the tendency of rising 
concentration to result in higher prices. Wal-Mart 
aggressively pursues an “everyday-low-pricing” 
(EDLP) strategy, and Wal-Mart Supercenters may 
set price on average 14 percent lower than com-
peting supermarkets (Bianco and Zellner 2003). 
Wal-Mart may also act as a “yardstick of compe-
tition” and reduce the prices of conventional su-
permarkets that compete directly with Super-
centers. Woo et al. (2001) indicate that entry of a 
Supercenter in the Athens, Georgia, area caused 
supermarkets to reduce prices significantly prior 
to entry, but that prices gradually rose back to 
their original levels following the entry. The only 
supermarkets showing lasting price effects were 
those with the highest prices at the beginning of 
the study. Volpe (2005) found that conventional 
supermarkets in the northeastern United States 
that competed with a Wal-Mart charged prices 
that were 6 to 7 percent lower for national brands 
and 3 to 7 percent lower for private label products 
compared to a control group of stores which did 
not face competition from Wal-Mart. 
 
6 Cotterill (1993) contains a debate on the issue of oligopoly power in 
grocery retailing, and Connor (1999) and Wright (2001) provide relatively 
recent critiques of research into the concentration-price relationship in gro-
cery retailing.  
Evidence on Grocery Retailer Oligopsony Power 
 
Retailers’ role as buyers from commodity ship-
pers and food manufacturers has received com-
paratively little attention. However, interest in the 
issue has increased in recent years in response to 
rising retailer concentration and concerns over 
slotting and related fees charged by retailers. Re-
tailer oligopsony power is difficult to investigate 
empirically because prices paid by retailers to 
shippers or manufacturers are typically not re-
vealed. Confidentiality of retailers’ selling costs 
and difficulties in apportioning them to individual 
products further complicates analysis. 
  Produce commodities provide some of the bet-
ter opportunities to examine retailer buying 
power because farm prices are typically reported 
publicly, as are shipping costs to major consum-
ing centers, and sales are often direct from 
grower-shippers to retailers. Sexton and Zhang 
(1996) examined pricing for California-Arizona 
iceberg lettuce and concluded that retailers were 
able to capture most of the market surplus gener-
ated, essentially consigning grower-shippers to 
near zero economic profits over the time period 
analyzed. More recently, Sexton, Zhang, and 
Chalfant (SZC) (2003) and Richards and Patter-
son (2003) investigated retailer pricing for a wide 
range of produce commodities as part of a USDA 
investigation of U.S. fresh produce markets (Dim-
itri, Tegene, and Kaufman 2003). SZC also found 
that retailers captured about 80 percent of the 
market surplus for iceberg lettuce, but found less 
evidence of oligopsony power for California 
vine-ripe and mature-green tomatoes and Florida 
mature-green tomatoes. Richards and Patterson 
(2003) found little ability for retailers to influence 
farm prices for fresh grapes and oranges, but con-
cluded that retailers held shipper prices below the 
competitive level for Washington apples and Flor-
ida grapefruits. 
 
Retailer Price Dispersion and the Farm-Retail 
Price Link 
 
In this section, we present four stylized facts 
about grocery retailer pricing and the link be-
tween prices at farm and retail. Following pres-
entation of the stylized facts and empirical evi-
dence in support of them, we ask to what extent 
the indicated behavior can be explained by the 
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extant economic theory and, finally, investigate 
the impact of some of the behavior on upstream 
producer markets. 
in retailers’ pricing and the tenuous linkage be-
tween farm and retail prices. Even though acqui-
sition costs should be very similar for retailers 
within a city, correlations of prices among the 
Los Angeles chains are rarely higher than 0.5 and 
are negative in some cases. Although shipping-
point prices for large and small avocados are 
highly correlated, the correlation of prices be-
tween large and small avocados even within the 
same retail account is typically low and some-
times even negative, even though these prices are 
subject to the same shipping-point price shocks 
and cost shocks at the retail account level. 
  Our work focuses primarily on fresh foods—
fluid milk and produce commodities. In many 
ways, these products are ideal for examining re-
tailer pricing behavior because they undergo rela-
tively little transformation in moving from farm 
to retail, have public data on farm prices, and are 
perishable, ensuring timely movement of product 
from farm to retail and making it easier to gener-
ate appropriate comparisons between farm and 
retail prices. 
  Because avocados are a perishable fruit, ship-
ment to retail and sale to consumers must occur 
quickly,
8 meaning that long lags in price response 
are unlikely. Further, because avocados are sold 
directly from grower-shippers to retailers, we 
might anticipate a strong link between shipping-
point and retail prices. However, nearly all of the 
correlations are below 0.5, many are below 0.2, 
and some are negative, regardless of whether cur-
rent or lagged shipping-point prices are used. 
 
Stylized fact 1: Prices among retailers in a given 
city for a given commodity exhibit wide disper-
sion. 
 
Stylized fact 2: Retail price changes are at most 
loosely related to price changes for the farm com-
modity, and, thus, acquisition costs play a com-
paratively minor role in the retail pricing decision. 
 
  Empirical studies document a remarkable de-
gree of cross-sectional price dispersion among 
food retailers within a city and intertemporal 
price variations for a given retailer (Pesendorfer 
2002, SZC 2003, Li and Sexton 2005). A basic 
source of price dispersion among retailers is the 
adoption of EDLP by some and “high-low pric-
ing” (HLP) by others. 
  Results for iceberg lettuce and iceberg-blend 
salad (IBBS) products for Los Angeles area chains 
in Table 2 tell a similar story. Price correlations 
among chains for the leading Dole brand of IBB 
salads are low and often negative. Even price 
correlations within a store for alternative sizes of 
IBBS are low. Although the main ingredient in 
IBBS is iceberg head lettuce, there is almost no 
correlation between retail prices for IBBS and 
shipping-point prices for iceberg head lettuce. 
  Evidence that variations in retail prices are not 
closely correlated with changes in the prices in 
the upstream market also abounds [MacDonald 
2000, Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (CKR) 
2003, SZC 2003, Hosken and Reiffen 2004a, 
2004b, Li 2006], suggesting that most retail price 
changes are strategic and not due to random 
shocks in the primary product market. Tables 1 
and 2 illustrate these points for California Hass 
avocados and iceberg lettuce salad products, re-
spectively. Table 1 reports correlation coefficients 
of prices for large and small Hass avocados 
among retail chains in Los Angeles and also the 
correlations between retail prices and contempo-
raneous and lagged shipping-point prices.
7 These 
basic statistics demonstrate both the heterogeneity 
 
Stylized fact 3: Transmission of farm price changes 




                                                                                   
  The transmission of price changes at the farm 
level to retail is a longstanding issue in agricul-
tural marketing. Under competitive retailing, price 
changes at the farm transmit fully and quickly, 
based upon shipping time to retail, but the empiri-
cal evidence mostly supports delayed, incomplete, 
and asymmetric price transmission, with farm price 
increases often transmitting more quickly to retail 
than farm price decreases. Pick, Karrenbrock, and 
7 Los Angeles is located proximate to the major growing regions for 
avocados, limiting the opportunity for unexplained cost shocks in mar-
keting to introduce variation into the farm-retail price relationship. Li 
(2006) demonstrates similar pricing patterns for avocados for a broad 
cross section of U.S. cities. 
 
8 Avocados can be stored less than 10 days at room temperature and 
less than two weeks under cooling. 
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Table 1. Shipping-Point and Retail Price Correlations for California Hass Avocados—Los 
Angeles Area Chains 
  LA-1-L LA-1-S LA-2-L LA-2-S LA-3-L LA-3-S LA-4-L LA-5-L LA-5-S 
LA-1-L  1.00          
LA-1-S  0.53  1.00         
LA-2-L  0.31  0.16  1.00        
LA-2-S  0.09  0.11  0.19  1.00       
LA-3-L  0.12 0.32 0.16 0.01 1.00         
LA-3-S  -0.09 0.30 0.04 0.35 0.33 1.00       
LA-4-L  -0.20 0.32 0.43 0.09 0.17  -0.05 1.00     
LA-5-L  0.51 0.55 0.31 0.24 0.22 0.38 0.34 1.00   
LA-5-S  0.31  -0.15 0.23 0.02 0.08  -0.26 0.25 0.04 1.00 
fob-L  0.13 0.27 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.13 0.36 0.35 0.32 
fob-L(-1)  0.16 0.29 0.15 0.33 0.17 0.15 0.34 0.35 0.31 
fob-S  0.28 0.35 0.26 0.45 0.10 0.16 0.40 0.43 0.35 
fob-S(-1)  0.28 0.38 0.27 0.48 0.12 0.18 0.34 0.44 0.33 
Note: LA-1-L (LA-1-S) denotes large (small) avocados sold at retail chain 1 in Los Angeles. Fob-L and fob-L(-1) denote contem-




Table 2. Correlations of Retail Prices in Los Angeles for Iceberg Lettuce and Iceberg-Blend Salad 
Retailer  Retailer 1  Retailer 2  Retailer 3 
Brand  Dole  Iceberg  Dole Dole Dole Iceberg Dole  Dole  Dole Iceberg 
Size  12 oz  Head  12 oz  16 oz  32 oz  head  12 oz  16 oz  32 oz  head 
1-Dole-12  oz  1.00           
1-Iceberg-head  -1.10  1.00          
2-Dole-12  oz  0.05  0.04  1.00         
2-Dole-16  oz  0.19  -0.01  0.80  1.00        
2-Dole-32  oz  0.37  -0.36  0.23  0.43  1.00       
2-Iceberg-head  -0.05  0.60 -0.12 -0.01 -0.23  1.00         
3-Dole-12  oz  0.15 -0.08  0.08  0.06 -0.18 -0.12  1.00       
3-  Dole-16  oz  0.26  -0.46 0.09 0.25 0.51  -0.21  -0.28 1.00     
3-  Dole-32  oz  0.09  0.01 -0.10 -0.11 -0.17  0.01  0.10 -0.08  1.00   
3-Iceberg-head  -0.20  0.76 -0.19 -0.16 -0.54  0.72  0.02 -0.42  0.09  1.00 
Shipping-point 
iceberg 
-0.07  0.59 -0.11 -0.06 -0.21  0.36 -0.08 -0.31 -0.02  0.45 
 
 
Carman (1990) for citrus, Zhang, Fletcher, and 
Carley (1995) for peanuts, Richards and Patterson 
(2003) for semiperishable fresh fruits, and Kinnu-
can and Forker (1987), Carman (1998), Frigon, 
Doyon, and Romain (1999), and Carman and Sex-
ton (2005) for dairy all found asymmetric response 
in retail prices and margins to farm price changes, 
with the speed of retail price changes being faster 
for farm price increases than for farm price 
decreases.
9
  For example, Carman and Sexton (2005) stud-
ied fluid milk pricing by fat content in five west-
                                                                                    
9 Powers and Powers (2001) reached the opposite conclusion, finding 
no asymmetry in the magnitude or frequency of price increases, rela-
tive to price decreases, for California-Arizona lettuce. 
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ern U.S. cities (Denver, Phoenix, Portland, Salt 
Lake City, and Seattle) and found price transmis-
sion that was consistent with predictions of the 
prototype competitive model (full and symmetric 
transmission) in only three of 40 possible in-
stances. In general, price transmission was de-
layed, incomplete, and asymmetric, with price in-
creases transmitting more quickly than price de-
creases (Table 3). Conclusions were less defini-
tive for four California cities, except for the clear 
result that price increases transmitted more 
quickly than price decreases. For California avo-
cados, Li (2006) found that on average only about 
one-third of a change in the shipping-point price 
was transmitted over time to retail. 
  It follows from stylized facts 1 through 3 that 
farm-retail price spreads computed at the level of 
the individual retail chain (i) exhibit wide vari-
ability over time, (ii) differ widely across chains 
with respect to mean and variance, and (iii) ex-
hibit little correlation across chains (SZC 2003). 
 
Stylized fact 4: Farm-retail price spreads for per-
ishable produce commodities increase in the vol-
ume of the commodity shipped. 
 
  Sexton and Zhang (1996) noted this phenome-
non for California iceberg lettuce. The result was 
confirmed by SZC (2003) for several California-
Arizona produce commodities and by Li (2006) 





Table 3. Lags in Months for Transmission of 
Farm Price Changes to Retail for Fluid Milk: 












Seattle  increase  0 1 1 1 
  decrease  1 1 1 1 
Portland increase  0 0 0 0 
  decrease  0 0 0 0 
increase  1 0 0 0  Salt Lake 
City  decrease  3 0 3 3 
Denver  increase  1 1 1 2 
  decrease  0 1 0 2 
Phoenix increase  0 0 1 0 
  decrease  1 3 3 0 
the SZC study for California-Arizona fresh pro-
duce commodities, illustrates the point. The elas-
ticity of the margin with respect to the volume of 
sales is positive in 29 of 32 cases and is based 
upon a significant coefficient in 18 of those cases. 
Specifying the margin to allow a one-week lag in 
transmission of farm prices to retail tended to 
weaken but not eliminate the impact of shipment 
volume on the margin. 
 
Can Economic Theory Help to Explain the 
Stylized Facts? 
 
A model of competitive food retailers and simple, 
cost-based margins cannot explain any of these 
stylized facts. Under perfect competition and 
cost-based, mark-up pricing, product prices for 
stores within a city should be highly correlated 
with each other and also with the price for the 
farm commodity. Further, price changes at the 
farm should transmit quickly and fully to retail. A 
model of perfect competition also predicts no 
asymmetries in response to price increases versus 
price decreases, and seems incapable of explain-
ing increasing margins as a function of farm-
product volume. Instead, Sexton and Zhang (1996) 
 
Table 4. Elasticities of the Farm-Retail Price 
Spread with Respect to Shipment Volume for 








Atlanta 1  0.672*    0.303* 
Atlanta 2    0.429  0.474* 
Chicago 1  0.422*  0.052   
Albany 1  0.232  -0.307   
Dallas 1  -0.011    0.358* 
Dallas 2  0.215  0.437*  0.619* 
Dallas 3  0.285    0.217 
Dallas 4    -0.285  0.203* 
Miami 1  0.692*    0.592* 
Miami 2  0.091  0.252   
Los Angeles 1 0.353*    0.305* 
Los Angeles 2 0.739*  0.229  0.229 
Los Angeles 3 0.879*  1.378*  0.230 
Los Angeles 4 0.501*  0.226*  0.201* 
Note: * indicates that the elasticity was computed from a coef-
ficient that was statistically significant at the 90 percent level. 
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offer an explanation based upon the attenuation 
of grower-shippers’ bargaining power during pe-
riods of high supply of a non-storable commod-
ity. 
  However, the stylized facts are also mostly 
inconsistent with traditional models of market 
power. For example, the low correlation of prices 
among retailers is inconsistent with retailer mar-
ket power generated through collusion. Under a 
typical collusive agreement, prices would be 
highly correlated. Thus, the relative independence 
of retailers’ price movements indicates that any 
selling-market power exercised by retailers is due 
to unilateral market power. 
  Models of seller market power can explain the 
result that retail prices respond only partially or 
not at all to changes in price at the farm level. 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) showed that sell-
ers with market power are more likely to maintain 
stable prices in response to changing costs than 
are competitive firms. The incentives are reversed 
for price changes due to demand shifts, but Ro-
temberg and Saloner showed that the cost effect 
dominates, when both cost and demand are sub-
ject to fluctuations.
10 In general, sellers with mar-
ket power rationally absorb a portion of any cost 
shock through their pricing to consumers, pro-
viding an explanation for only partial transmis-
sion of prices. Partial absorption of a farm price 
increase represents a balancing of the marginal 
impact of a lower profit per unit from not fully 
transmitting the cost shock with lower profit from 
reduced sales if the cost increase is transmitted 
fully. For example, a monopolist facing a linear 
demand schedule will transmit exactly half of a 
cost shock forward to consumers. 
  Although price rigidity is consistent with seller 
market power, it can also be explained by re-
pricing or menu costs within a competitive mar-
ket framework (Levy et al. 1997), or by some re-
tailers’ use of EDLP as an overarching marketing 
strategy in a differentiated oligopoly framework. 
Lal and Rao (1997) showed that adoption of 
EDLP by one firm and HLP by the other can be 
an equilibrium outcome of duopoly competition 
among retailers. However, EDLP would not be 
sustainable in competitive retail markets because 
 
10 The fundamental intuition is that as the extent of competition in-
creases, individual sellers perceive an increasingly elastic demand. 
This makes price changes more beneficial because some of the benefits 
are derived at the expense of competitors. 
an EDLP retailer who did not reduce retail prices 
in response to decreases in farm prices would be 
undercut by retailers who transmitted farm price 
changes fully. 
  When changing prices is costly for retailers, a 
product’s price will be fixed unless its marginal 
cost or demand changes by a sufficient amount to 
justify incurring the cost of re-pricing (Carlton 
1989, Azzam 1999). However, menu and other 
costs associated with adjusting prices should 
cause prices to not adjust at all to minor shocks 
and to adjust fully to major shocks. The empirical 
evidence showing partial adjustment to shocks in 
the farm price is consistent with a market-power 
model, but not an adjustment-cost model. 
  Asymmetry of price transmission, wherein farm 
price increases are passed on to consumers more 
quickly than farm price decreases, is also not 
readily explained within a competitive framework 
or by conventional models of monopoly or oli-
gopoly. In a standard model of monopoly or oli-
gopoly pricing, the optimal price change in re-
sponse to a given increase or decrease in marginal 
costs may not be symmetric, and depends upon 
the convexity/concavity of consumer demand 
(Azzam 1999). However, because most demand 
curves are more elastic at higher prices, demand 
curvature considerations ordinarily call for retail-
ers to absorb a greater share of a cost increase 
than a cost decrease (Bettendorf and Verboven 
2000), which, as noted, is not what the evidence 
tends to show. Demand curvature considerations, 
moreover, cannot explain a delay in responding to 
a price decrease, relative to a price increase. 
  Levy et al. (2005) offer an interesting explana-
tion for asymmetry of price adjustments based 
upon theories of rational consumer inattention. 
They present empirical evidence that small price 
increases among grocery retailers occur more fre-
quently than small price decreases but that no 
asymmetry exists for large price changes. They 
posit that rational inattention among consumers 
makes demand for individual products in stores 
very inelastic around the region of the current 
price, thus making price increases profitable but 
providing little benefit to decreasing price. 
  Seminal papers by Salop and Stiglitz (1977) 
and Varian (1980) offer explanations for the ex-
istence and persistence of price dispersion at re-
tail based upon imperfect consumer information. 
Salop and Stiglitz show the existence of equilibria 
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)
where some stores sell at the perfectly competi-
tive (minimum-average-cost) price to fully in-
formed consumers, and the rest sell only to unin-
formed consumers at a higher price. The lower 
volume of the high-price stores exactly compen-
sates for the higher profit per sale. 
  Varian (1980) argues that persistence of price 
dispersion due to imperfect consumer information 
seems implausible if consumers can learn from 
experience. He instead proposes a model where 
each retailer randomly chooses a price from a 
continuous distribution (i.e., mixed strategies) in 
each period, and decides between setting a high 
price and selling only to uninformed consumers, 
and charging a low price and selling to informed 
consumers as well. 
 
How Does Retailers’ Pricing Behavior Affect the 
Farm Product Market? 
 
Retail prices that respond more quickly and fully 
to farm price increases than to farm price de-
creases are harmful to producer interests. Retail 
prices that adjust only partially, or not at all, to 
shocks in the farm market are also harmful to 
producers. We demonstrate this point by investi-
gating the implications for producers of an ex-
treme form of incomplete price transmission, 
namely the case of EDLP—a retailer holds price 
constant despite shifts in production and prices at 
the farm level. The fundamental point is that, if 
some share of the final sellers of a commodity 
hold price constant, despite shifts in supply 
and/or aggregate demand, then price must fluctu-
ate more widely for all other sellers, in order for 
the market to clear. The logic of the argument ap-
plies equally to situations where some sellers do 
not maintain a fixed price per se, but instead sta-
bilize it relative to market conditions and thus 
only partially transmit farm price changes. 
  Figure 1 demonstrates the basic point for the 
case of two market outlets. The left quadrant de-
picts the aggregate retail market, and the right 
quadrant depicts the aggregate of all other market 
outlets, and is referred to as “food service.” 
11  is final demand in the food service mar-
ket, less all shipping and marketing costs, and 
22  is final demand in the retail market, less 
all shipping and marketing costs. For simplicity, 
 and  are assumed to be identi-






F DH 22 (
F DH
0, is divided 
equally between the two markets. Under perfect 
competition in procurement,  1
F D (H1) and  2
F D (H2) 
are demand curves for the farm product in the 
respective sectors. Given total harvest H0, farm 
price would be P0 in each market under perfect 
competition. Under buyer power in procurement, 
farm price would be less than P0. 
  Suppose that production increases to H0 + ∆, 
while demand remains unchanged. If both mar-
kets allow price to change in response to the in-
crease in production, each sells 0.5(H0 + ∆) and 
price in each market falls to P1. The increase in 
producer revenue in each market is the area, 
ABCD. However, if the retail market maintains a 
fixed selling price despite the change in produc-
tion, sales at retail remain at 0.5H0, and the per-
unit farm value remains P0 in the retail sector. For 
the increase in production to clear the market, it 
must move entirely through the food service mar-
ket, which now sells 0.5H0 + ∆, with farm value 
in the food service market falling to P2.
11 The 
marginal revenue from the new production is now 
illustrated by the area ABEF in Figure 1, where 
ABEF < 2(ABCD).
12
  The result illustrated in Figure 1 holds broadly. 
A sufficient condition for fixed prices to be harm-
ful to producer welfare is that marginal revenue is 
a decreasing function of sales for all market out-
lets.
13 Although Figure 1 illustrates a situation 
with elastic demands and positive marginal reve-
nue, the conclusion applies to markets with ine-
lastic demands. The logic also applies equally to 
decreases in production. Finally, the presence of 
                                                                                    
11 Because P0 > P2, standard arbitrage would call for product to move 
from food service to retail, but these forces are frustrated if retailers 
insist on holding price at P0. Only 0.5H0 can be sold at retail for price 
P0. 
12To gauge the importance of this effect for producer revenue, SZC 
(2003) conducted a simulation with parameter values chosen to 
roughly approximate conditions for iceberg lettuce in the United 
States. Depending on the specific parameterizations chosen, stabilized 
prices at retail reduced revenues to grower-shippers in a range from 0.6 
to 3.5 percent. The adverse effect of fixed/stabilized prices on revenue 
is greater (i) the more volatile is periodic supply, (b) the greater the share 
of the market represented by sellers who adopt stable prices, and (c) 
the more price inelastic is the farm demand. 
13 Let inverse demand in a market j be denoted as Pj(Hj), where Hj 
denotes sales in market j. Total revenue in market j is TRj = Pj(Hj)Hj. 
Marginal revenue is MRj = dTRj/dHj = Pj′(Hj)Hj + Pj(Hj), and dMRj/dHj 
= Pj″(Hj)Hj + Pj′(Hj) + Pj′(Hj). Thus, dMRj/dHj
 < 0 whenever 2Pj′(Hj) < 
-Pj″(Hj)Hj. This condition holds for all concave demand curves, includ-
ing linear, and also mildly convex demands. 
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Figure 1. Impact of Constant Selling Prices on Producer Welfare 
perfect competition in any of the procurement 
etailer Pricing and Marketing Strategies 
Stylized fact 5: Retail food prices often have a 
tylized fact 6: For a given product category, re-




markets does not alter the fundamental conclu-
sion. Farm sector income will be lower due to 
fixed prices, even if the farm sector captures only 







well-defined mode, and most deviations from the 
mode are downward, reflecting temporary sales. 
 
S
tailers who choose to hold sales also exhibit con-
siderable heterogeneity in (i) choices of brands to 
 
feature on sale, (ii) frequency of sales, and (iii) 
 
Considerable empirical evidence suggests that 
tailers’ price reductions are often attributable to 
sales strategies, which are the result of decreases 
rterly and annual modal 
14 It might be argued that consumers prefer stable prices, so retailers 
who hold prices constant despite fluctuations in market conditions ac-
tually increase demand for the product (Okun 1981). Indeed, this logic 
is presumably the basis for EDLP. However, as noted, stabilizing 
prices in one sector of the market implies even greater price instability 
in the other sectors, which, under the same logic, would have an ad-
verse effect on demand in those sectors. 
magnitude of discounts. 
re
in margins rather than decreases in costs (Mac-
Donald 2000, CKR 2003, Hosken and Reiffen 
2004a, 2004b, Li and Sexton 2005). Hosken and 
Reiffen (2004a) analyzed retail prices for twenty 
categories of grocery goods in thirty geographic 
areas. They showed that a typical product has a 
“regular” or modal price, and that most deviations 
from the regular price are downward and short-
lived. Temporary price reductions account for 20 
to 50 percent of annual variations in retail prices 
for the grocery products in their study. Li and 
Sexton (2005) and Li (2006) found similar price 
patterns for U.S. packaged salad products and 
avocados, respectively. 
  Table 5 and Figure 2 illustrate these patterns of 
variations in retail prices for California Hass avo-
cados. In Table 5, qua
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ies of retail prices 
Table 5. Variations in Retail Prices for Hass Avocados 
  The average frequenc
Size  = mode  < mode 




The average frequencies of retail prices > mode, by 
20.43 (12.84)   17.29 (31.58)  62.28 (55.58) 
 
 10%  30%  20% 
large  6.02 (13.37)   3.97 (9.21)  2.69 (6.70) 
The average frequencies of retail prices < mode, by 
small  7.42 (17.71)  5.53 (12.10)  3.62 (7.99) 
 
 10%  30%  20% 
large  33.78 (35.73)  21.82 (23.29)  14.19 (12.26) 
  small  33.27 (32.66)  20.92 (21.66)  12.26 (12.44) 
Note: The num
the paren
bers outside and to the left of the parentheses are calculated according to annual modal prices, and the numbers in 
theses are calcul quarterly modal price
rices were computed for each size of Hass avo-
ado sold by each retail account. Then the aver-
om-
equal to one were realized with positive probabil-
ity mass, but the shipping-point price indices did 
A growing body of evidence indicates that re-
ta
(e 5, MacDonald 2000, 
KR 2003, Hosken and Reiffen 2004b). Li 





age frequencies of retail prices equal to, greater 
than, or less than the quarterly (annual) modes 
across all retail accounts and over time for each 
size of Hass avocados were computed. The fre-
quencies computed by the quarterly modal prices 
are reported to the left of the parentheses, and 
those computed by the annual modal prices are 
reported in the parentheses. Retail prices were at 
the quarterly (annual) modes for 21 (13) percent 
of the observations, and were below the quarterly 
(annual) mode for 62 (58) percent of observa-
tions. Overall, temporary price reductions defined 
as decrease in retail price from its quarterly mode 
by at least 20 percent accounted for 26 and 28 
percent of quarterly variations in retail prices for 
small and large Hass avocados, respectively. 
  Figure 2 displays histograms for retail price in-
dices and the shipping-point price indices c
puted by dividing the observed price by its quar-
terly modal price for each size of Hass avocados. 
The kernel density is estimated by the Epanech-
nidov kernel function. The density estimations fit 
the histograms in lines. Because there are multi-
ple modes for shipping-point prices, we used the 
highest quarterly modes. The retail price indices 
not have any dominant value with significantly 
high probability. The distributions of the ship-
ping-point price indices are symmetric compared 
with the distributions of the retail price indices, 
which are evidently asymmetric, flatter to the 
right of the modes than to the left. 
 
Stylized fact 7: Retail prices are often lower dur-
ing periods of high demand. 
 
 
il prices often fall in periods of high demand 
.g., Warner and Barsky 199
C
(2006) identified six holidays/events—Christ-
mas/New Year, Super Bowl Sunday, Cinco de 
Mayo, Memorial Day, Independence Day, and 
Labor Day—that saw significantly higher de-
mands for avocados in the shopping week(s) pre-
ceding and/or during the holiday (see Table 6). 
Among the six, Christmas/New Year, Super Bowl 
Sunday, and Cinco de Mayo were associated with 
significantly lower prices, lower retail margins, 
and higher incidence of temporary price reduc-
tions. Prices were significantly higher in the 
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Figure 2. Histogram with Kernel Density Estimation for Retail Prices and Shipping-Point Prices 
for California Avocados 
eeks associated with Memorial Day. Independ-
nce Day and Labor Day had no significant ef-
 product category, re-
tailers exhibit considerable heterogeneity in the (i) 
 
  ocumented variability 
 private label share among chains for dairy and 
three leading brands of IBBS. Seven chains car-
ried two brands—Fresh Express and Dole in five 
al and Matutes (LM) (1994) explain retail sales 
ailing 
it to 
surplus to consumers. In their two-prod-
ct model, advertising conveys price information 





fects on retail pricing. Temporary price reduc-
tions were more likely to take place in association 
with each holiday, but in the cases of Memorial 
Day, Independence Day, and Labor Day the ef-
fects were not significant. 
 
Stylized fact 8: For a given
number of brands carried, (ii) choices of which 
brands to carry, (iii) decision whether or not to 
carry a private label brand. 
Dhar and Hoch (1997) d
in
edible grocery products for five U.S. cities. Table 
7, adapted from SZC (2003), illustrates the styl-
ized fact for IBBS. Among the 20 sample retail 
chains, only the Los Angeles chains carried Ready 
Pac IBBS, and none carried minor brands outside 
of the top three. Only Los Angeles 2 carried all 
of those cases, with Dole and Ready Pac and 
Fresh Express and Ready Pac comprising the 
other two. Six chains carried a private label 
brand. Among those chains, three carried only 
their private label brand, two carried their private 
label and one other brand (Dole, in each case), 
while the other carried both Dole and Fresh Ex-
press. Finally, three chains carried Fresh Express 
IBBS exclusively, while two carried Dole IBBS 
exclusively. 
 




in terms of the multiproduct nature of ret
and the need for retailers to credibly comm
provide 
u
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 P
Price  Spread 
Table 6. Effects of Holidays and Events on Retail ricing 
 Retail 
Sales 
Retail  Price 
Christmas/New Year’s 4.347**  -0.040**  -0.041** 
 (2.010)  (0.016)  (0.019) 
Super Bowl Sunday  15.040***  -0.093***  -0.104*** 
inco de Mayo 
aster Sunday 
emorial Day 
dependence Day  7.303*** 
abor Day 
alloween 
hanksgiving  0 0.043*** 
 (2.735)  (0.018)  (0.021) 
C 5.077*  -0.046**  -0.034 
 (2.776)  (0.023)  (0.027) 
E 2.662  0.033**  0.031 
 (2.031)  (0.017)  (0.020) 
M 6.044**  0.048**  0.017 
 (2.712)  (0.022)  (0.026) 
In 0.010  -0.006 
 (2.510)  (0.021)  (0.025) 
L 3.536*  -0.010  0.002 
 (1.976)  (0.017)  (0.020) 
H 1.531  0.012  -0.052** 
 (2.068)  (0.078)  (0.201) 
T -1.763  .024*** 
 (1.606)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthe wo, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 90 percent, 95 
ercent level, respectively. 
 that any prod-
uct whose price is not advertised will yield them 
ero surplus. Given this expectation, a consumer’s 
-
plain why the goods chosen to be advertised often 
price even though there are no changes in costs or 
demand. Therefore, both theories offer explana-
tions for a weak relationship between retail and 
rs are likely to have popular, high-de-
 
ses. One, t
percent, and 99 p
 
to consumers, who believe correctly
z
decision on which store to visit is based on the 
surplus derived from the purchase of an assort-
ment of goods. LM show that one of the two 
equilibria results in both firms advertising the 
same good, and for a wide range of parameters 
the advertised good is sold below marginal cost. 
  A typical supermarket carries thousands of 
products and offers a bundle of goods on sale 
each week. LM’s (1994) static model cannot ex
change weekly. Nor does the model provide any 
predictions for the dynamics of retail pricing. It is 
reasonable that retailers differentiate themselves 
by advertising different items each period and 
promoting a product at different periods of time. 
Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004b) extended the 
LM multiple-product analysis to a dynamic set-
ting. Their model predicts considerable variation 
in the frequency and magnitude of sales across 
products. 
  Both the Varian (1980) and LM (1994) models 
show that retailers have incentives to cut retail 
farm prices (stylized fact 2). LM’s model predicts 
that retaile
mand products on sale, in order to compete for 
consumers’ store patronage—by committing ex 
ante to provide surplus. Therefore, their model 
offers an explanation for putting a product on sale 
during its peak demand periods (stylized fact 7). 
  Warner and Barsky (1995) offer an alternative 
explanation for countercyclical price movements 
in the spirit of Salop and Stiglitz’s (1977) imper-
fect information model based on economies of 
scale in consumer search. Consumers engage in 
more searching and traveling between stores dur-
ing peak demand periods, such as Thanksgiving
and Christmas holidays, than at the other times. 
Consumers thus are more informed during these 
times and, accordingly, their demands are more 
price elastic when the overall demand is high. 
Consequently, retailers rationally offer lower prices 
when the overall demand is high. 
  One distinction between the explanations by 
LM (1994) and Warner and Barskey (1995) is 




Table 7. Retailer Brand Selection, Mean Price, and Variance of Iceberg-Blend Packaged Salads
  Private Label  Fresh Express
  Dole
 
Los Angeles 1  1.404 (0.050)       
Los Angeles 2    1.526 (0.063)  1.416 (0.029)  1.356 (0.049) 
Los Angeles 3  1.48 08)  1  
1.685( 005)  1.490 ( .011) 
1.331 ( .038) 
1.636 ( .042) 
1.931 ( .019) 
1.394 ( .003) 
1.619 ( .068) 
    6 (0.0 .490 (0.007)
Los Angeles 4   
1.652 ( .023) 
0.   0
Dallas 1  0      
Dallas 2      1.354 (0.015)   
Dallas 3    1.410 (0.053) 
1.901 ( .032) 
   
Dallas 4    0    
Dallas 5    0 1.943 (0.115)   
Atlanta 1    1.702 (0.041)     
Atlanta 2    1.724 (0.122)     
Atlanta 3  0 1.685 (0.121)   
1.977 ( .146) 
 
Chicago 1    1.625 (0.044)  0  
Chicago 2    1.896 (0.028)  0  
Chicago 3   
1.487 ( .052) 
2.035 (0.147)     
Miami 1  0      
Miami 2    1.668 (0.080)  1.605 (0.049) 
1.520 ( .002) 
 
Miami 3  0 1.882 (0.023)  0  
Albany 1  1.630 (0.038)    0  
Albany 2      1.430 (0.079)   
N nces are indicated in
 
t atter predict lower r tail prices during 
ring the idio-
syncratic demand peaks. Retailers in LM’s model 
re more likely to put a product on sale during its 
odel shows 
degree of co rogeneity, relative mag-
nitudes of sales cost and brand-carrying cost, and 
the number of available brands. Thus, optimizing 
retailers may exhibit heterogeneous behavior in 
ontems, Monier, and 
ote: Varia  parentheses. 
hat the l e
aggregate demand peaks, but not du
a
high-demand periods even if they do not coincide 
with aggregate demand peaks. Second, LM sug-
gest that retailers will put a product on sale under 
ordinary demand conditions as long as it is a 
“popular” product, whereas Warner and Barskey’s 
model implies that retailers have no motivation to 
reduce retail prices or retail mark-ups when the 
aggregate consumer demand is low. 
  Xia and Sexton (2006) provide an explanation 
for the heterogeneity of retailer behavior regard-
ing carrying multiple brands of a product and 
holding promotional sales. Their m
that carrying multiple brands and holding promo-
tional sales are substitute tools that can be used 
by retailers with market power as instruments to 
conduct price discrimination when they face het-
erogeneous consumers. The optimal combination 
of brands and sales for a retailer depends on vari-
ous factors including the quality range of product, 
terms of carrying brands and holding promotional 
sales because the aforementioned factors associ-
ated with them are different. 
  Most explanations for retailers’ use of private 
labels focus on the opportunity of retailers to in-
crease bargaining power relative to sellers of na-
tional brands (e.g., Mills 1995, Raju, Sethuraman, 
and Dhar 1995). The equilibrium depends on the 
quality level of the private label, whether the re-
tailer has a cost disadvantage relative to the na-
tional-brand manufacturer (B
nsumer hete
Requillart 1999), and the substitutability (i.e., in-
tensity of competition) among national brands 
and between national brands and the private label 
(Raju, Sethuraman, and Dhar 1995). In general, 
these explanations seem useful in explaining why 
some products feature private labels and others do 
not, but less suited to explaining heterogeneity 
among retailers in terms of use of private labels. 




rk-up) strategy or a pro-
How Do Retailers’ Sales Strategies Affect the 
Farm Product Market? 
 
We focus on the pricing strategies of (i) holding 
periodic sales irrespective of conditions in the 
upstream market (stylized fact 5), and (ii) reduc-
ing price during peak demand periods for the 
product (stylized fact 7). First, consider a scenario
based upon stylized fact 5 where retailers eit
use a no-sales (i.e., ma
motional strategy where the product is placed on 
sale at the end of an N+1 (N ≥ 1) period horizon. 
In the no-sales strategy, retailers set the retail 
price for each period (e.g., week) based on the 
market condition of farm supply and consumer 
demand. For simplicity, we assume that the mar-
ket conditions do not change during the N + 1 
periods under study so that retailers using mark-
up pricing charge the same price for all periods. 
In the sales strategy, retailers charge regular prices 
for N periods and hold a sale in period N + 1 by 
charging a lower price. We analyze and compare 
the impact of the sales strategy and the basic no-
sales strategy on the farm market and producer 
welfare for the N + 1 periods. 
  ()
F DH in Figure 3 is the demand curve in the 
farm market in the case of perfect competition, 
and  ()
F MRH  is the marginal revenue curve. In 
the first scenario, retailers set the same price for 
all N + 1 weeks so that retail and farm quantity 
demanded are also the same. The farm demand in 
each of the N + 1 weeks is H0, and the farm price 
  is ming competitive procurement). In the 
second scenario, retailers set a high regular price 
in th eeks and a low sales price for the 
th (+ 1 ) N  week so that the quantity demanded is 
low in the first N weeks and high in the 
th (+ 1 ) N  
week. Ignoring the possible lag between the de-
mand pattern at retail and the similar pattern at 
the farm level, this implies that quantity demanded 
at the farm is low in the first N weeks and high in 
the 
th (+ 1 ) N  week. The low farm demand in the 
eeks is H
P0 (assu
e first N w
first N w r and the high farm demand in 
the 
th (+ 1 ) N  week is Hs. The farm prices in the 
first N weeks and the 
th (+ 1 ) N  week are Pr and 
Ps, respectively. 
  Compared to the base, no-sales scenario, pro-
ducer revenue changes by the area CDEF – 
N*A  the scenario when retailers use pro-
motional sales. The key question is whether 
CDE ABCD is negative. The answer de-




wo scenarios. With different sell-
ing strategies, the distribution of consumer and 
farm demand over the whole time horizon is dif-
ferent but the total demand is very likely to be 
similar. When the total retail and farm demand 
over the N + 1 weeks are similar for the two 
strategies so  00 *( ) s r H HN HH − ≈− , it can be 
shown that CDEF – N*ABCD < 0, i.e., producer 
revenue is lower under the sales strategy. Similar 
to the case of constant retail prices (Figure 1), this 
result holds broadly. A sufficient condition for 
CDEF – N*ABCD < 0 is also that marginal reve-
nue is a decreasing function of sales (see footnote 
13). 
  Producer revenue and surplus with the sales 
strategy will also decrease even if total retail and 
farm demand with the sales strategy is mildly 
larger than the demand with the no-sales strategy 
because CDEF – N*ABCD < 0 is possible even 
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  Producer revenue with the sales strategy will 
inc demand with rease only if the total   the sales 
trategy is sufficiently larger than the total de-
mand with the no-sales strategy. However, in this 
case production costs are also higher due to the 
larger volume sold, so the producer surplus with 
e sales strategy may still not increase. Thus, we 
                                                                                   
s
th
conclude that producer revenue and surplus likely 
decrease when retailers use promotional sales as a 
selling strategy. The intuition is that the decrease 
in producer revenue due to selling less during the 
N non-sale periods when the farm price and mar-
ginal revenue is relatively high is more than the 
 
15 We use a linear functional form of the demand function to derive 
the inequality condition, 
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k when the farm price and 
arginal revenue are relatively low.
16
To analyze the impact on producer welfare of 
k demands, 
 N period(s) of normal demands after 
 
increase of producer revenue from selling 
during the sale wee
m
 
holding sales during peak-demand periods (styl-
ized fact 7), we consider two scenarios: (i) retail-
ers use a no-sales strategy during pea
and (ii) retailers conduct sales during peak de-
mands, in a time horizon that includes one period 
of peak demand and N ( 1 N ≥ ) equal period(s) of 
normal demand after the period of peak demand. 
The total consumer demand in the entire time 
horizon is assumed to be the same under the two 
scenarios. 
  To facilitate exposition, we use a simple spec-
ification by assuming that consumers purchase 
the same amount of the product under study in 
each of the
the period of peak demands. Panels (a) and (b), 
respectively, of Figure 4 describe the farm market 
during the period of peak demand and each period 
of normal demand. 
F
k D (H) = α*
F
u D (H), α > 1, is 
the demand curve in the farm market during the 
period of peak demand (subscript k).  ()
F
u DH  is 
the demand curve in the farm market during each 
period of normal de d (subscr u).  ()
F
k man ipt  MRH  
and ( )
F
u MRH  are the marginal revenue curves. 
                                                                                    
16Retailers’ promotional offers may also reduce producer welfare by 
introducing quantity and price fluctuations into the farm market, which 
increases the risk faced by producers. 
The superscripts 1 and 2 denote the no-sales and 
sales scenarios, respectively. 
  In the no-sales scenario, the retail and farm de-
mand is  k
1 H  for the period of peak demand and 
1
u H  for each period of normal demand. In the sec-
ond scenario when retailers hold sales during the 
peak demands, the retail and farm peak-period 
demand is 
2
k H  and is 
2
u H  for each period of nor-













u H , which means 
that total consumer demand in the entire time ho-
n is the same under the two scenarios. 
  Compared to the no-sales scenario, producer 
revenue will increase by the area ABCD during 
the period  peak dem nd and decrease by the 
area EGIM during each p orm  
rizo
of  a
eriod of n al demand
change 
when retailers hold sales during the peak demand. 
The net change in producer revenue is the area 
ABCD – N*EGIM. The sign of this net 
depends on the relative magnitude of the areas 
ABCD and N*EGIM. Because we have 
2
k H − 
11 2 *( ) ku u H NH H =− , the relative magnitude of the 
two areas will depend on (i) the demand differ-
ence between the period of peak demand and 
each period of normal demands, which is repre-
sented by the parameter α, and (ii) how quickly 
the consumer demand in the normal periods after 
the peak demand absorbs the impact of the sales 
strategy resented by the parameter N. 
As the value of α decreases, the area ABCD be-
comes smaller and the sign of the net change of 
producer revenue is more likely to be negative. 
As the values of N decrease, the area N*EGIM 
becomes larger with the value of 
12 *( ) uu NH H −  
held constant, and the sign of the net change of 
producer revenue is also more likely to be nega-
tive. Sales during peak demands are more likely 
to reduce producer revenue and surplus if the dif-
ference between the peak and normal-period de-
mands is small and/or the consumer demand in the 
normal periods after the peak dem  







, which is rep
and needs to
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Panel b: Each normal demand period after peak demands Panel a: The period of peak demands  




etail grocery chains are the dominant players in 
e vertical market channel for many commodi-
egions of the world, including the 
nited States, Europe, and parts of Asia and 
outh America (Coyle 2006). Retailers, through 
, and strategies concerning sales and 
price-taking retailer, but that most of the indicated
consistent with traditional 
models of market power. Although theory does 
provide cogent explanations for aspects of the 
caused by economies of size and scope generated 
  behavior was also in
R
th
ties in many r
U
S
mechanisms of vertical control, can exert a strong 
influence on the behavior of upstream suppliers, 
and play a major role in determining the charac-
teristics of the products offered in their stores. 
Although the extent of retailers’ market power as 
sellers to consumers or as buyers from suppliers 
is controversial and surely depends on the spe-
cifics of the various market settings, retailers, 
based upon their demonstrated behavior, clearly 
have the power to influence prices and thus to 
impact the welfare of both producers and con-
sumers. 
  Despite their unquestionably important, if not 
dominant, role in the food system, we know 
rather little about retailers’ behavior in terms of 
choices of products and brands carried, pricing 
strategies
promotions. The goal of this paper has been to 
lend some insight on these dimensions of retailer 
behavior and to analyze the impacts of various 
aspects of retailer behavior on the upstream farm 
markets. In this regard, we offered evidence in 
support of eight stylized facts regarding retailer 
pricing, retail price dispersion, the farm-retail 
price linkage, and retailers’ marketing strategies. 
We then argued that little, if any, of this behavior 
could be explained by a model of a competitive, 
behavior summarized here, much more needs to 
be done. An area of particular neglect is analysis 
of the implications of retailer behavior for the 
upstream markets. Using simple models, we 
showed that some typical retailer pricing strate-
gies were likely to be detrimental to producer 
welfare. 
  The revolution in food retailing toward larger 
and more dominant chains is unlikely to abate 
and, indeed, seems destined to spread worldwide. 
The implications of the revolution for consumers 
and producers are not clear and deserve further 
study. Although large retailers most likely pos-
sess some degree of oligopoly power, a strong 
argument can be made that consumers benefit on 
net from the revolution due to lower prices 
 
by large chains and by the access they offer to a 
vast array of products. The impact on producers, 
especially small-scale producers, is probably less 
favorable. There is little evidence that economies 
of size and scope generated by large food retailers 
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